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1. Introduction
We analyze a firm’s decision to participate in public meetings which determine regula-
tion.1 Using data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we find
that firms with a preference for extreme policies are much more likely to participate in
public meetings than firms with a preference for moderate policies. We also find that
participation rates are higher for larger, closer, and more influential firms. These results
are of interest for several reasons.
Voluntary meetings with costly participation are ubiquitous as an institution for re-
source allocation. Examples include; faculty meetings, parent teacher association meet-
ings, and condominium association meetings. Moreover, the requirement that regulators
allow and encourage public participation is an almost universal feature of the US regu-
latory process.2 Yet, despite their importance, meetings with costly participation are little
studied, and basic questions about them are unanswered: Who goes? Does participation
vary with observable characteristics? Do meeting participants represent the interested
population? Our analysis of the Mid-Atlantic clam fishery answers these questions: large,
nearby extremists participate in meetings with costly participation.
It is clear that these findings improve our understanding of voluntary participation in
costly meetings, and hence of most regulatory decisions taken in the United States. How-
ever, they also suggest a refinement in our intuition about regulatory capture. At least
where regulation is determined in a participatory process, we should expect regulation to
reflect the interests of firms whose tastes are extreme.
An immediate consequence of our results is that laws designed to encourage public
participation in the regulatory process, like those in the US, do not serve to elicit inform-
ation about the preferences of a representative or average member of the public. To the
contrary, such laws elicit the opinions of individuals most interested in the regulation, and
individuals with the most extreme tastes. A review of the available theoretical literature
suggests that such over-participation of extremists is undesirable.
1We thank seminar participants at the Hoover Institution, University of Maryland, University of Toronto,
SUNY Buffalo, University of Alberta, and University of Calgary for helpful comments and suggestions.
Special thanks to Henning Bunzel, Dave Wallace and Clay Heaton for helpful comments and discussions.
We are also grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor of this Journal for helpful suggestions.
2The Administrative Procedure Act requires that all US federal regulatory agencies “shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation”(Title 5 U.S. Code §553(c), 1988 edition.).
In Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Environmental Protection Agency the Supreme Court showed its willingness to
require that public opinion be adequately consulted. (In this case, the court vacated proposed regulation
because the Environmental Protection Agency prematurely ended public hearings and deprived the public
of sufficient opportunity to “comment [on], analyze, and influence the [regulatory] proceedings”. In this
case public participation is mandated by the Toxic Substances Control Act rather than the Administrative
Procedure Act.)
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Domination of public meetings by extremists may partially explain management prob-
lems in US fisheries. In 2002, the National Marine Fisheries Service,3 reported that 93
of the 304 fish populations under its jurisdiction were either overfished or exploited at
unsustainable levels, a situation which places the federal government in violation the
Magnuson Act’s injunction against overfishing.4 The regional ’management councils’
which formulate most regulation for federal fisheries bear much of the responsibility for
this situation. These councils have a statutory obligation to solicit the opinions of industry
by holding public meetings. Since pervasive problems of regulatory capture are alleged
(Pew Ocean Commission, 2003; see also Johnson and Libecap, 1982), and since fisheries
regulation is determined at meetings with costly participation, our results suggest that if
US fisheries regulators are captured, it is most likely by firms whose tastes are extreme
even among the population of regulated firms. In all, this suggests that the current
administration’s proposals for ”streamlining the public comment [process]”5 for fisheries
regulation can be improved. Such streamlining involvesmarginal changes in participation
costs rather than a qualitative change in the nature of the participation decision, and as
such, should not be expected to reduce the influence of extremists.
Finally, our findings confirm recent theoretical results requiring political polarization
and bipartisanship to emerge in democratic institutions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section surveys the relevant theoretical lit-
erature on political participation. Section 3 presents background information about the
Mid-Atlantic clam fishery and the way the fishery is regulated. Sections 4-5 establish a
link between our data and participation patterns predicted by the theoretical literature.
Descriptive statistics, the econometric model, and results are presented in sections 6-8.
The remaining sections interpret the empirical results, discuss policy implications, and
summarize the key findings.
2. Relevant literature and its implications
Relatively few papers provide positive analyses of patterns of participation. Osborne,
Rosenthal, and Turner (2000) analyze participation patterns at meetings where participa-
tion is costly and the outcome is a compromise among those who attend. Feddersen (1992)
analyzes costly voting in majority rule ‘elections’ where agents simultaneously choose a
policy and whether or not to vote. Although these authors consider different institutions,
basic features of their models and results are similar.
3The National Marine Fisheries Service is the federal agency principally responsible for monitoring the
status of fisheries in federal waters.
4Title 16 U.S. Code §1851(a)(1), 1996 edition.
5NOAA press release, NOAA 03-081, June 27, 2003.
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Both papers consider ’spatial models’. That is, an outcome or policy is a point in space
and agents have preferences over these points. Each agent’s utility is maximized at a
single policy and declines as the selected policy is further from this bliss point. In both
papers participation is costly and an agent decides to participate on the basis of howmuch
his participation affects the outcome, taking as given the participation behavior of other
agents. If and only if the value of the change in outcome associated with participation is
greater than the participation cost does the agent participate. All else equal, agents with
lower participation costs will be more likely to participate, agents whose participation
causes a larger shift in the outcome will be more likely to participate, and agents who
value a marginal change in the outcome more highly will be more likely to attend.
Osborne et al. (2000) argue that, in equilibrium, agents whose bliss points are near
the anticipated outcome are less likely to participate than those whose bliss points are
far from the outcome. That is, agents with moderate preferences do not participate in
meetings. Intuitively, participation by agents close to the outcome does not move the
outcome enough to justify their participation costs. Feddersen (1992) shows that, in
equilibrium, agents in a region adjacent to the outcome do not participate. This results
in patterns of participation similar to those predicted by Osborne et al. (2000).
In a related paper, Campbell (1999) considers elections inwhich agentsmay cast a costly
vote for one of two exogenously fixed alternatives when both the size of the electorate
and the bliss point of any given voter is random. This analysis, too, concludes that a
democratic process with voluntary participation is likely to be dominated by extremists.
Another related inquiry examines the way that various collective choice institutions
aggregate private information about an uncertain state of the world. While much of
this literature does not allow for endogenous participation, there are two noteworthy
exceptions, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and Li, Rosen and Suen (2001).
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) consider the ability of elections, with costless voting,
to aggregate private information when abstention is possible. They find that only agents
who do not strongly prefer one outcome to another ever abstain from voting. Li, Rosen
and Suen (2001) consider the ability of a quite different institution, committees, to aggreg-
ate information. Like Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), when abstention is permitted,
Li et al. (2001) find that agents who strictly prefer one outcome or have an unambiguous
signal in favor of one outcome, are more likely to participate in committee meetings. Thus,
like Osborne et al. (2000) and Feddersen (1992) both Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) and
Li et al. (2001) find that agents who prefer extreme outcomes are more likely to participate
in a collective decision.
In sum, several different models of the participation decision indicate that agents with
extreme positions in the policy space are more likely to attend meetings and participate in
regulatory decisions than are their more moderate counterparts. Another way of stating
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this conclusion is that a polarized political process is a natural consequence of democracy.
If we are willing to regard the two extreme factions of participants as nascent political
parties, these models provide an explanation for the emergence of a two-party political
process. Thus, it is worth noting that political scientists do observe polarization in national
politics, (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2001)), and that the two party state is a common
feature of economic models, e.g., Alesina (1990) and Biais and Perotti (2002).
There is, to our knowledge, only one empirical paper examining patterns of participa-
tion at public meetings. Bulkley, Miles, Pearson, and Bernhard (1999) find that members
of England’s House of Lords are less likely to participate in house meetings and vote if
they are not affiliated with a party than if they are affiliated with a party. If we posit that
unaffiliated Lords aremore politically moderate than partymembers this may be evidence
that meetings are attended by extremists. On the other hand, one probable function of
parties is to ’get out the vote’, so that this conclusion is not compelling.
There is also anecdotal evidence to suggest that meetings tend to attract extremists. The
regulation of New England federal fisheries and Rhode Island state fisheries depends on
the results of regulatory meetings which are open to public participation. Allen (1991)
describes a conflict between conservation-minded sport fishers and extraction-minded
commercial fishers in Rhode Island. Both groups took fairly extreme positions and the
attendance at two successive public hearings was lopsided in different directions, produ-
cing a policy that was first pro-conservation and then pro-extraction. Similarly, the record
of the public hearings held by the New England Fishery Management Council (1985, p.
9.45) describes a conflict between two different groups of fishers (gillnetters and trawlers),
who attended successive public hearings in lopsided proportions. As in Rhode Island, the
result was a policy that first favored one group, then the other.
In sum, the anecdotal evidence suggests that public participation affects the decisions
taken at regulatory meetings, and that participants at these meetings appear to have
preferences for policies that are extreme relative to those of the affected population.
3. Background
To more thoroughly investigate participation in costly meetings we collected firm-level
data from the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery during the period 1990
to 1998. These data are well suited to our inquiry into participation behavior for three
reasons. First, they describe the universe of firms affected by the regulatory outcome,
whether they participate in the regulatory process or not. Without data on all firms
affected by the regulation, an analysis of the participation decision is impossible. To our
knowledge similar data has not been considered elsewhere, although analyses of firm
characteristics conditional on participation in the regulatory process have been conducted,
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e.g., Ando (1999), Cropper et al. (1992). Second, our data allow us to identify individual
’fishing firms’, collections of vessels, processing plants and harvest permits (or ’individual
tradable quota’), with a common owner. Enumerating the assets that comprise a firm is
essential to an investigation of how firm characteristics influence participation. Finally,
as we will argue below, the nature of regulatory decisions in this fishery is particularly
simple and corresponds closely to models used in theoretical analyses of participation
decisions.
TheMid-Atlantic clam fishery targets surf clams and ocean quahogs in state and federal
waters off the coasts of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey. Vessels harvest
clams year round by towing dredges across the underwater clam beds and then pumping
the clams to the surface using hydraulic pumps. Vessels deliver unshelled clams to land-
based processing plants. Processing plants extract the clam meat. After resale, clam meat
is used primarily in chowder and seafood soups. Surf clam and ocean quahog landings
in the Mid-Atlantic region in 1998 had an ex-vessel value of $23.65 million and $16.56
million, respectively.
Prior to October 1990, the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council regulated the
fishery with vessel entry limitations and harvest time restrictions. Since October 1990 the
fishery has been regulated with an individual tradable quota program. At the inception of
this program regulators distributed quota shares to vessel owners according to a formula
that increased both with vessel size and historic harvest levels. In each year the regulatory
process determines a total allowable catch for both clam species. Resource users are
allowed to harvest a share of the total allowable catch determined by the amount of
individual tradable quota that they own or rent.
We compile our data primarily from three sources. First, National Marine Fisheries
Service logbook data that records all fishing and processing activity in the clam fishery.
Logbook data record every vessel’s harvests, along with the processing plant which pur-
chases each trip’s harvest. Thus, these data identify all active vessels and processing plants
in the fishery during the 1990-98 study period.
The second data source is a public record of individual tradable quota ownership
maintained by the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council. This record lists the name
of each person or firm that owns quota and the number of shares held. Using this
information, together with supplementary vessel and plant ownership information from
theMid-Atlantic FisheryManagement Council, theNationalMarine Fisheries Service, and
industry members, we matched vessels, processing plants and quota holdings to firms.
Our third data source is the minutes of regulatory meetings where total allowable
catches are discussed. From these minutes we extract a list of participants at each meeting,
along with information about what was said at each meeting. When the firm affiliation of
a meeting participant was not clear from the minutes, we consulted industry members to
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 Physical Assets Quota Assets All Assets 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Year Harvest Firms Vessels 
Process.
Firms 
Process.
Plants 
Unique
Firms SC OQ 
Unique 
Firms 
Pure 
Quota 
Owners 
Unique 
Firms 
           
1990 36 124 18 22 48 54 54 54 21 69 
           
1991 32 76 16 20 42 48 37 53 25 67 
           
1992 30 66 17 20 42 47 37 52 24 66 
           
1993 29 62 18 21 42 47 36 52 25 67 
           
1994 25 57 14 17 34 45 35 51 29 63 
           
1995 25 59 13 16 33 41 31 50 27 60 
           
1996 24 53 11 13 30 44 31 52 30 60 
           
1997 21 50 11 14 27 44 29 49 30 57 
           
1998 21 47 7 9 23 45 30 50 31 54 
Table 1: Capital and quota ownership in the Mid-Atlantic clam fishery. Columns
describe: 1 - Firms that own fishing vessels. 2 - Active vessels in the
fleet. 3 - Firms that own processing plants. 4 - Active processing plants.
5 - Firms that own physical capital. 6 - Firms that own surf clam quota.
7 - Firms that own ocean quahog quota. 8 - Firms that own quota. 9 -
Firms that own quota but not physical capital. 10 - Total firms active
in fishery.
match meeting participants to the correct firms.
Industry organization
Any US citizen may own tradable quota, and few restrictions are placed on quota trading
other than a requirement that no individual own more than 20% of the total available
quota for each clam species. The market for the sale of quota has been active throughout
the 1990-98 study period. Quota rental is also common. A detailed description of the op-
eration of the individual tradable quota program in this fishery is available in Committee
to Review Individual Fishing Quotas (1999).
Table 1 describes the ownership of fishing vessels, processing plants, and quota in the
final year of the limited entry management program (1990) and the first eight years of the
individual tradable quota program (1991-1998). Columns 1-5 show that many firms own
both fishing vessels and a processing facility. This table also shows that the numbers of
harvesting, processing, and quota owning firms all declined under the individual tradable
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quota program. Physical capital employed in the fishery also decreases: The number of
vessels decreases from 124 to 47 and the number of processing plants from 22 to 9.6 Firms
owning quota in 1998 were more likely to specialize in surf clams or quahogs than they
were in 1990.
Lastly, the individual tradable quota program has allowed the emergence of a class of
pure quota owners who own quota but do not own physical capital (column 9). Many of
these firms harvested clams prior to the individual tradable quota management program
and so were allocated quota, but subsequently sold their vessel(s). About one third of
firms in 1990 and over half in 1998 fall into this class. Pure quota owners are much smaller
than other firms on average. Not only do they not own physical capital, but their holdings
of quota are also small. An average pure quota owner holds 23,468 bushels of surf clam
quota, and 35,337 bushels of ocean quahog quota, versus 50,302 bushels of surf clam and
105,412 bushels of ocean quahog quota for an average firm that also owns physical capital.
Regulatory process
All fisheries operating in federal waters along the middle Atlantic coast are regulated by
the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council.7 A subcommittee of this council, the Surf
Clam and Ocean Quahog Committee, is responsible for recommending total allowable
catches for the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries to the council. The Surf Clam and
Ocean Quahog Committee convenes a Science and Statistics Committee to review the
available scientific information and formulate a policy recommendation. In each year,
the Science and Statistics Committee recommends a total allowable catch to the Surf Clam
and Ocean Quahog Committee which accepts or amends the recommendation (or calls for
more research), and passes it to the full council.8 The full council then accepts or amends
the recommendation, or asks for more research to be done. After the council accepts a
regulation, it is passed to the Secretary of Commerce for a final and nearly automatic
approval.
Table 2 shows the total allowable catch for each species for each year, and the proportion
of this total allowable catch that was eventually harvested. During the early years of the
study period the industry consistently harvested the entire surf clam total allowable catch.
6Rumors that the initial allocation of individual tradable quotas would depend on historical catch records
may have delayed the abandonment of some vessels until the individual tradable quota program was in
place. Many of the exiting vessels were scrapped.
7 Council members are selected by the governors of the affected states and are approved by the Secretary
of Commerce. Broadly, council members are industry representatives, representatives of state fisheries and
environmental bureaucracies, and academics. For details of the selection and appointment process see Title
16 U.S. Code §1852, 1988 edition.
8A Science and Statistics Committee meeting is not convened in years where the scientific information
available to the Surf Clam and Ocean Quahog committee about stock abundance is easy to interpret.
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  Surf  Clam Ocean Quahog 
Year Total Allowable 
Catch 
% Harvested Total Allowable 
Catch 
% Harvested 
     
1990 2.850* 109% 5.300 87% 
     
1991 2.850* 94% 5.300 91% 
     
1992 2.850* 99% 5.300 93% 
     
1993 2.850* 99% 5.400 89% 
     
1994 2.850* 100% 5.400 85% 
     
1995 2.565* 99% 4.900 94% 
     
1996 2.565* 100% 4.450* 99% 
     
1997 2.565 94% 4.317* 99% 
     
1998 2.565 92% 4.000* 99% 
Table 2: Total allowable catch levels, 1990-1998 (fromMid-Atlantic Fisheries Management
Council, August 1998). ’∗’ indicates a binding total allowable catch. Harvest in
excess of the total allowable catch of surf clams in 1990 is a consequence
of administrative problems at the inception of the individual tradable quota
program.
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On the other hand, the ocean quahog total allowable catch is only fully harvested towards
the end of the sample. We will later argue that attendance behavior should be different
during years when the total allowable catch is binding than in years when it is not. With an
eye to tests of this hypothesis we designate years 1990-96 as years when the surf clam total
allowable catch was binding, and 1996-98 as years when the ocean quahog total allowable
catch was binding. Note that we class 1991 as a binding year for surf clams, despite the
fact that Table 2 indicates that only 94% of the total allowable catch was harvested. In fact,
all of the available total allowable catch was harvested, and the apparent surplus reflects
an ex post revision of accounting practices (Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council
(1992)).
Table 3 provides summary information about the meetings where the total allowable
catch for surf clams or ocean quahogs was discussed between 1990 and 1998. The council
and its subordinate committees reach decisions according to a carefully followed process
wherein a motion must be introduced by a voting member, seconded, debated, and put to
a vote. Members of the public who participate in a council meeting are usually permitted
to speak only during a question and answer period. Meetings of the Surf Clam and Ocean
Quahog Committee are often less formal. Public participants in the regulatory meetings
are not compensated and must bear their own transportation costs.
A small number of individuals have special status as ’industry advisors’ to the coun-
cil. When these individuals participate in a council or committee meeting in their role
as advisors, they are permitted to participate in council or committee debates, but not
vote. Industry advisors are compensated for travel to those meetings where the council
requests their presence. According to industry sources, when the council selects industry
advisors, it does so by soliciting volunteers. Nearly all volunteers are accepted,9 and the
term of an advisor is typically three to five years. Since volunteering to be an advisor is
essentially an offer to participate in many meetings, we expect that the same factors that
influence a firm’s decision to participate in a meeting also affect its decision to become an
advisor. Therefore we will correct for the probable endogeneity of advisor status in our
econometric analysis.
In all, the administrative record indicates that 197 individuals attended a meeting. 53
of these individuals are linked to a particular clam fishing firm, 84 are bureaucrats, 40 are
linked to other fisheries, 9 are academics, 2 are environmentalists and 9 are of unknown
affiliation. Firms are usually represented by a principal or employee, although firms hire
lobbyists occasionally.
The 40 individuals linked to other fisheries appear exclusively at meetings of the Mid-
Atlantic FisheryManagement Council, meetings where only part of the agenda is devoted
9Lee Anderson, (personal communication 2000).
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Date Location Represented Firms Represented Firms 
(% of year’s total) 
    
8/13/90 Essington, PA 6 8.7% 
    
9/19/90 Hauppauge, NY 8 11.6% 
    
8/19/91 Dover, DE 4 6.0% 
    
9/05/91 Philadelphia, PA 1 1.5% 
    
8/27/92 Essington, PA 10 15.2% 
    
9/16/92 Essington, PA 6 9.1% 
    
5/05/93 Essington, PA 11 16.7% 
    
6/02/93 Norfolk, VA 3 4.5% 
    
12/15/93 Virginia Beach, VA 0 0% 
    
9/12/94 Essington, PA 17 27.0% 
    
9/24/94 Philadelphia, PA 10 15.9% 
    
7/18/95 Essington, PA 12 20.0% 
 
8/3/95 
 
Wilmington, DE 
 
9 
 
15.0% 
 
9/20/95 
 
Philadelphia, PA 
 
6 
 
10.0% 
    
9/4/96 Philadelphia, PA 10 15.0% 
    
9/19/96 Philadelphia, PA 9 15.0% 
 
8/12/97 
 
Philadelphia, PA 
 
9 
 
15.8% 
    
Claymont, DE 9 8/6/98 
  
16.7% 
 
8/19/98 Philadelphia, PA 9 16.7% 
 
Table 3: Public attendance at meetings where the total allowable catch for surf clams and
ocean quahogs was selected.
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to the clam fishery. Although our record of attendance does not specify which of the
several sessions of the full council meeting that an individual attends, we have no record
that any of the individuals linked to other fisheries ever commented during the sessions
devoted to the clam fishery. Thus it is highly probable that these individuals did not
attend sessions addressing clam issues at all, and we make no further effort to analyze
their attendance behavior.
4. Conformance of fact to theory
Relationship between participation and outcome
The details of the relationship between participation and outcome vary considerably from
one theoretical analysis to another. For example, Osborne et al. (2000) consider an axio-
matic description of reduced form ’compromise functions’ which relate participation to
outcomes, while Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1992) consider median voting. However
the requirement that participation affect the choice of policy with some probability is
universal.
In the real policy making process, only council members vote on the total allowable
catch, and only committee members vote on recommendations that are passed to the
council. Public participation can affect policy outcomes only if it leads voting members to
introduce motions or causes them to change their votes on existing motions. The public
record and feedback from industry members suggest that firm participation at meetings
does, in fact, influence meeting outcomes through precisely this channel.
The minutes of the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council meeting of September
28, 1994 show that a council member introduced a successful motion for a higher ocean
quahog total allowable catch in response to industry outcry. The council’s behavior in this
instance is broadly consistent with reports from members of the council: ”Industry input
is always considered very seriously by the Council. For example, the staff recommended
a 5% increase in the surf clam quota for the year 2002. Primarily at the request of industry,
the Council voted to increase it by 10%.”10 Perhaps more important, members of industry
believe that their participation affects the outcome of regulatory meetings. An industry
source tell us that a 10% reduction in surf clam total allowable catch in 1994, and a 500,000
bushel increase in ocean quahog total allowable catch in 1998 were in response to industry
requests.11
10Clay Heaton, personal communication (2001).
11Dave Wallace, personal correspondence (2000).
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While it is not uncommon for a firm to attend a meeting and not say anything that is
recorded in the administrative record,12 the converse is also true. Firms do speak on the
record, often to advocate a choice of total allowable catch for one or both clam species.
Consistent with the assumptions of the theoretical literature, it appears that such firm
participation can induce a voting member to introduce or change his vote on a motion,
and thereby affects the outcome of a meeting.13
Policy space
The theoretical literature analyzing participation in democratic institutions typically con-
siders ’spatial’ policy decisions that involve the choice of one or more real numbers (e.g.,
Osborne et al., 2000; Feddersen, 1992). Since a choice of total allowable catches for surf
clams and ocean quahogs is a choice of two real numbers, the policy space is a subset
of the real plane. Thus, the actual policy space appears to correspond precisely to those
commonly considered in the theoretical literature.
This conclusion is complicated by the fact that in some years choices on transitory issues
that are not real numbers are required. For example, in one year policymakers determined
the details of enforcement policy, in other years they debated whether an experimental
fishery for Maine clams was in fact an allowable experiment or an attempt by a (very
remote) fishery to operate outside the individual tradable quota program. Given that the
council often makes two separate decisions, one on a transitory issue and one on the total
allowable catches, the reasonableness of our decision to analyze only the choice of total
allowable catches hinges on the two decisions being made independent of each other.
The administrative record indicates that the two decisions are, in all likelihood, inde-
pendent. First, transitory issues are often discussed at meetings where they are the sole
topic of debate (we exclude such meetings from our sample). Second, we do not see trans-
itory issues linked to the choice of total allowable catch in debate, e.g., statements such
as, “The decision on the total allowable catch depends on the decision on the transitory
issue” do not appear in the administrative record. Thus, on the basis of the administrative
record, it is reasonable to think that firms’ preferences over the total allowable catch do
not change very much with the decision made on the transitory issue. This conclusion
is also consistent with the nature of the transitory decisions, for example, refinements of
enforcement procedures or the inclusion or exclusion of the relatively small and remote
12The administrative record consists primarily of minutes for the various meetings. The quality of these
minutes varies from a complete verbatim transcript, to partial summaries of what was said. Thus, our
record of comments directed to the council is somewhat incomplete. Comments made off the record are,
by definition, not recorded. (We note that meeting attendance and meeting minutes are typically recorded
separately.)
13An econometric examination of the relationship between the characteristics of attendees (or statements
made by attendees) and changes in the total allowable catch proved uninformative.
12
Maine clam fishery in the individual tradable quota program. Since these are decisions
that should have only a minor impact on most firms, for most firms the decisions on these
transitory issues will also have only minor effects on the marginal profits of quota, and
hence on their preferences over the choice of total allowable catch.
Preferences
Finally, in the theoretical literature, e.g., Osborne et al. (2000), heterogeneity in the agents’
preferences is completely described by the heterogeneity of their bliss points. Less form-
ally, the disutility of a given deviation from an agent’s bliss point does not vary with the
agent’s position. This is probably not true for the firms in our sample. All else equal, a
given deviation away from its profit maximizing total allowable catch will be more costly
for a large firm than a small firm. In response to this discrepancy, our econometric analysis
controls for the importance of a firm’s position, holding other firm characteristics constant.
5. Measuring Extremism
To examine the hypothesis that firms with more extreme positions are more likely to
participate in meetings, we must first address the problem of measuring the ’extremeness’
of a firm’s preferred or profit maximizing choice of total allowable catch. Since we do
not observe firms’ preferences directly, we face the difficult problem of constructing an
index which co-varies with these preferences. Our premise is that a firm which is more
specialized in physical capital (vessels and processing plants) or quota, will have more
extreme preferences over the total allowable catch than a firm which is more diversified.
Our premise is consistent with the simple model of rent division illustrated in Figure 1.
Q denotes the quantity of clams harvested, S(Q) the industry supply, and P the price for
processed clam meats.14 There is one clam species, one extraction sector, and all markets
are competitive. The total allowable catch is Q. In equilibrium, firms bid-up the price of
quota, r(Q), until the marginal cost of harvesting a unit of clams just equals the market
price, P, minus the quota price, r(Q). In Figure 1, Q∗ denotes the total allowable catch
at which the marginal profit from extraction is zero. At Q∗ the quota rental price is zero.
With the introduction of a binding total allowable catch, Q < Q∗, the rental price of quota
is strictly positive, r(Q) = P− S(Q) > 0.
In Figure 1, at total allowable catch level Q, rents for the extraction sector are given by
the shaded area, while rents for the quota owners are given by the hatched area. Rents
for the extraction sector are increasing in Q and reach a maximum when Q = Q∗. Rents
14Figure 1 depicts a constant price for clam meats. While the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog
fishery accounts for a substantial share of US clam production, competition from imports, other types of
clams, and other clam substitutes suggests that the demand for processed clams is elastic.
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P − r(Q¯)
S(Q)
P
Q¯ Q∗Q˜ Q
$
Figure 1: A simple model of rent division. S(Q) is industry supply, P the
price for processed clam meats. The total allowable catch is Q, and r(Q)
the rental price for a unit of quota. Q∗ denotes the quantity of clams
at which the marginal profits from extraction declines to zero. At total
allowable catch Q, rents for the extraction sector are given by the shaded
area, while rents for quota owners are given by the hatched area.
for quota owners are maximized when r(Q)Q is maximized. This occurs at a value of Q˜
which is strictly smaller than Q∗. Given Q˜ < Q < Q∗, quota owner rents are decreasing in
Q. Thus, for Q˜ < Q < Q∗, quota owners prefer marginal decreases in the total allowable
catch while owners of physical capital oppose them. Therefore, this model implies that,
when the total allowable catch is binding, a firm’s preferences over the total allowable
catch will vary with specialization into physical capital or individual tradable quota. In
particular, firms that are more specialized in quota support a marginal decrease in the
total allowable catch, while firms that are more specialized in physical capital prefer the
opposite.
The assumption which drives the disagreement between quota owners and capital
owners is that the supply curve is upward sloping, at least in the short run.15 Possible
reasons for such a positive slope are specificity of clam harvesting and processing capital,
or capital adjustment costs.
The model also suggests that more and less specialized firms will not disagree about
marginal changes to the total allowable catchwhen the total allowable catch is not binding:
If the total allowable catch is strictly larger than Q∗ then the price of quota is zero and all
15Otherwise, extracting firms make zero profits at all levels of the total allowable catch and would not
disagree with the quota owners about the level of the total allowable catch.
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 Surf Clam 
Stated Position 
Average Surf Clam
Position Index 
Ocean Quahog 
Stated Position 
Average Ocean 
Quahog Position Index 
1 =  Increase   
(n=23) 
 
0.425 1 = Increase  
(n=30) 
0.292 
0  = No Change  
(n=11) 
 
0.159 0 = No Change 
(n=13) 
0.028 
-1 = Decrease  
(n=9) 
0.529  -1 = Decrease  
(n=18) 
-0.395 
 
Table 4: Position conditional on stated position.
firms assign a zero value to a marginal change in the total allowable catch.
A comment in Mid-Atlantic Fisheries Management Council (1998, p. 23) indicates
that an understanding of this model is widespread among regulators and firms: ”Some
consider it a matter of basic equity that quotas under an individual tradable quota fishery
not be set far in excess of market needs, so that the majority of holders will be able to sell
their share of the quota”. The description of firms’ preferences derived from our model
of rent division is also consistent with the description of preferences given by meeting
participants at the September 1992 meeting in Essington, PA, “If you own allocation, you
want a small quota, and if you don’t own allocation you want a bigger quota, ...”. That
is, preferences over the total allowable catch vary with the degree of specialization in
physical capital versus quota. Another participant at this meeting gives a less complete
description consistent with similar preferences, “If you have a lot of quota that you con-
trol, the less of it there is the more valuable.”
Wemake use of the following index to measure the extent to which a firm is specialized
in physical capital or quota ownership,
position =
max {Harvested bushels, Processed bushels} − Bushels of quota owned
max {Harvested bushels, Processed bushels}+ Bushels of quota owned.
This index ranges between -1 for a firm that owns only quota, to 1 for a firm owning only
physical capital. Thus, position exhibits the requisite property of assigning a more extreme
value to firms that are more specialized in quota or physical capital. We normalize the
position index by a measure of firm size. In principle, this will allow us to distinguish
between the effects of size and position on firm attendance behavior. Since we are con-
cerned with a two dimensional policy space, a choice of total allowable catch for surf
clams and for ocean quahogs, we calculate firm position indices for each species.
If the position index and firms’ statements at meetings both reflect the firms’ underlying
preferences over policies, then we should see firms’ statements varying systematically
with their position. More specifically, if our model is correct we should see that firms
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with smaller (larger) position indices are more likely to advocate for smaller (larger) total
allowable catch’s.
Since we have access to the minutes of meetings at which the total allowable catches
were selected, we are able test this hypothesis. For each meeting and species, for the
subsample of firms for whom a partisan statement about the total allowable catch appears
in the administrative record, we construct a variable stated positionwhich takes the values
-1, 1, or 0 according to whether the statement advocates a decrease, increase, or no change
in whichever total allowable catch is under consideration. Thus, for a subsample of
firms, stated position provides us with a measure of firms’ stated preferences over the total
allowable catch.
To test the relationship between position and stated position Table 4 reports means of
position conditional on stated position. Table 4 shows a strong correlation between stated
position and position. For ocean quahogs, the relationship between mean position and stated
position is strongly monotonic. A test of the null hypothesis of common position indices
for firms advocating a larger and smaller ocean quahog total allowable catch is rejected at
the 99% confidence level. For surf clams, the relationship between the average position
index and stated position is as expected, with one exception. The average value of the
position index for the nine instances when a firm called for a smaller surf clam total
allowable catch exceeds the average position of the remaining groups. Closer analysis
reveals that this unexpected result is due to one outlying firm. If this firm is removed,
resulting mean position is 0.152, and the relationship between position and stated position is
againmonotonic. With the outlying firm removed, a test of the null hypothesis of common
position indices for firms advocating a larger and smaller surf clam total allowable catch
is rejected at the 96% confidence level.
In all, the relationship between a firm’s actual position in policy space and our position
indices is consistent with a theoretical model based on unrestrictive assumptions, with
statements made by firms’ representatives, and with an observed relationship between
firms’ stated positions and the calculated position indices.
6. Descriptive statistics
Table 5 summarizes firm characteristics for the whole sample of 87 firms, and for the
subsets of firms that do and do not attend at least onemeeting. The table reports themeans
of four measures of mean firm size: number of vessels owned, number of processing
plants owned, and, quota holdings for each clam species. The table also reports; mean
travel distance between the center of the zip code containing a firm’s mailing address and
the center of the zip code containing the meeting site, the number of firms that only own
quota, and finally, the number of firms with advisor status.
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 Full Sample Participants Non-participants 
    
Firms 87 27 60 
 
Pure Quota Firms 
 
49 7 42 
Vessels .79 (1.50) 
2.09 
(2.10) 
0.20 
(0.44) 
    
Plants .27 (0.52) 
0.44 
(0.69) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
    
Surf Clam Quota 
(‘000 bushels) 
35.19 
(78.19) 
80.33 
(124.57) 
14.88 
(26.84) 
    
Ocean Quahog Quota 
(‘000 bushels) 
65.95 
(159.69) 
150.07 
(243.22) 
28.09 
(80.05) 
    
Distance 
(miles) 
202.07 
(144.84) 
138.62 
(71.13) 
230.62 
(160.25) 
    
Advisors 12 12 0 
Table 5: Firm characteristics. The unit of observation is a ’firm-year’, and
averages are taken over this set of observations. Firms are classified as
participants if they attended at least one of the nineteen meetings in our
sample. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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On average, participating firms have more capital than non-participating firms. This
is true for every measure of capital that we use, vessels per firm, processing plants per
firm, and quota per firm.16 Table 5 also shows that participating firms are located 92 miles
closer to the meeting site than non-participating firms, on average. All firms with advisor
status attended at least one meeting.
Table 5 also shows that pure quota owners are much less likely to attend meetings than
other firms. We believe that there are two reasons for this. First, as noted earlier, pure
quota owners are much smaller, on average, than other firms. They own no physical
capital and typically own small amounts of quota. Second, the animosity of fishermen
towards absentee quota owners is strong and well documented (Committee to Review
Individual Fishing Quotas (1999)). As such, the social interaction required at meetings is
probablymore costly for them than for other firms. Given this, we expect that the behavior
of these firms may be different from their more diversified counterparts.
We now turn our attention to the relationship between a firm’s position and its attend-
ance behavior. Figure 2 presents histograms showing participation rates conditional on
surf clam and ocean quahog position. In each of the six figures, the dashed line plots
the OLS regression of attendance on position and position2, while the solid line plots the
results of a kernel regression of attendance on position.17 The top row presents results
where the position index is calculated for ocean quahogs, while the bottom row presents
the corresponding results for surf clams.
The figures in the left column of Figure 2 are based on the full sample of firms and
meetings. Figures in the middle column report results when pure quota owning firms
are excluded, i.e., those with position -1 are dropped. Finally, the figures in the right
column exclude pure quota owning firms and meetings conducted in years where the
relevant total allowable catch was not binding (see Table 2). Thus, Figure 2c (2f) is based
on meetings conducted in 1996-8 (1990-6).
In every case we see that the kernel regressions are bimodal. Excluding pure quota
owners from the sample in Figures 2b and 2e shows that other firms with positions on
the extreme left have high attendance rates. If we consider only years where the total
allowable catch is binding, we see in Figure 2c that extremism becomes much more
important for ocean quahogs. On the other hand, in Figure 2f, the relationship between
attendance and surf clam position changes little when we drop years when the surf clam
total allowable catch was not binding. It is not clear what inference we should make from
this, however, since the surf clam total allowable catch failed to bind in only two years.
16In subsequent regression analysis processing plant size is adjusted for capacity. For each year and plant,
we observe the volume of clams processed. Our measure of the plant capacity is the maximum observed
annual volume of clams processed by a plant, normalized so that the sample average plant has size unity.
Hereafter, references to the plants variable are understood to refer to this index.
17Specifically, we present kernel estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel with a window width of 0.4.
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(a) Full sample. N=1168.
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(b) No pure quota owners. N=771.
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(c) No pure quota owners. Binding years. N=197.
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(d) Full sample. N=1168.
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(e) No pure quota owners. N=742.
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(f) No pure quota owners. Binding years. N=663.
Figure 2: Attendance rates conditional on position. In each figure the dashed line
plots the OLS regression of attendance on position and position 2, while
the solid line plots the results of a kernel regression of attendance on
position. Figures (a)-(c) ((d)-(f)) are based on ocean quahog (surf clam)
position. Figures (a) and (d) are based on the full sample of firms, (b)
and (e) exclude pure quota owners, (c) and (f) exclude pure quota owners and
meetings that occur in years where the relevant total allowable catch is not
binding. Note that the vertical scale is different for the surf clam and
ocean quahog figures.
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7. Econometric Model
The descriptive statistics suggest that firm characteristics matter in the expected ways,
and that firms with more extreme tastes for the total allowable catch are more likely to
attend regulatorymeetings. We now assess the robustness of these conclusions controlling
for observed and unobserved firm characteristics, and for the possibility that regulatory
decisions are not equally important in all years.
Our unit of observation is a firm’s decision to participate in a particular meeting. Let
Aim denote a meeting indicator variable that is one if firm i attends meeting m, and zero
otherwise. The attendance probability is Pr(Aim = 1) = F(β′zim + λt + αi) where F is
the logistic cumulative distribution function, zim is a vector of firm and meeting charac-
teristics, β is a common parameter vector, λt is an unobserved time-specific effect, and
αi is an unobserved firm-specific effect. Firm-specific effects represent firms’ unobserved
preferences for participating in meetings. Time-specific effects control for unobserved
year to year differences in the economic environment, or, for year to year differences in
the average firm’s interest in the year’s choice of total allowable catch. A firm that is active
throughout the nine year study period would account for 19 observations. Our panel is
incomplete because some firms exit or enter the fishery during the study period. Data are
available for 87 firms which account for a total of 1,168 observations.
The parameter of interest, β, can be estimated under the assumption that firm-specific
effects are random or fixed components of preferences. Despite the similar error struc-
ture, the two corresponding estimation procedures exploit different characteristics of the
sample. The random effects estimation uses within firm variation, and also cross-sectional
variation between firms that attend at least one meeting and firms that never attend. The
fixed effects estimation, however, makes exclusive use of within firm variation for firms
that attend at least one meeting. Given the merits of each specification we estimate β
under both the random and fixed effects assumptions. The exact specifications of these
likelihood functions are given in the appendix.
8. Regression results
To test whether extremists are more likely to attend than moderates, all else equal, we
conduct regressions which predict attendance as a function of position and position2, along
with different combinations of control variables. If extremists have higher attendance
rates then we should see that the coefficient of the second order term is positive while the
first order term is zero or small enough that the minimum of the position quadratic lies
near the center of the [−1,1] range of position.
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To ease exposition, in most regressions we aggregate position across species. Thus, in
Table 6, the variable ’Position’ is the sum of a firm’s position index for surf clams and ocean
quahogs, and ’Position2’ is the sum of the corresponding squared indices. Similarly, the
variable ‘Quota’ is the sum of the firm’s surf clam and ocean quahog individual tradable
quota holdings.
Model 1 of Table 6 predicts attendance as a function of linear and quadratic position
terms, and an indicator that is one for pure quota owning firms. In Model 1 the coefficient
of the quadratic position term is significant and positive, while the coefficient of the linear
term requires that the minimum of the position quadratic fall near the center of the range
of the position variable, at -0.26. These results are consistent with higher attendance rates
by extremists than moderates.
Model 2 of Table 6 duplicates Model 1, but controls for firm size and travel distance.18
Aside from individual tradable quota holdings, all of the control variables have the expec-
ted effect on attendance; larger, closer firms are more likely to attend. Contradicting our
findings in Table 5, Model 2 suggests that larger quota holdings are not associated with
higher attendance rates. This finding is persistent and seems to be driven by correlated
measures of firm size for a small number of firms holding large amounts of quota and
other physical capital. In an unreported regression we drop all firm characteristics except
for individual tradable quota and the pure quota firm indicator from Model 2. We find
that the individual tradable quota term is positive and significant at the 1% level, with
other coefficients qualitatively unchanged.
As in Model 1, in Model 2, the coefficient of the quadratic position term is positive, but
is different from zero only at the 87% confidence level. Controlling for other firm factors
has a more dramatic effect on the coefficient of the linear position term. In Model 2, and
in all subsequent models, this linear term is small in magnitude and is not statistically
different from zero at standard levels of confidence. Thus, as the hypothesis that extrem-
ists are more likely to attend requires, the data suggest that the minimum of the position
18It is at least possible that the choice of meeting site is endogenous. This would occur if, for example, the
council tried to hold meetings near firms that it thought were likely to participate or if firms that wanted
to participate lobbied for meetings close to home. There is no evidence to support these stories. The Mid-
Atlantic Council has a policy of rotating meeting sites through the different states in its jurisdiction, and of
holding meetings in hotels that offer special rates to government and a free shuttle to the nearest airport.
In addition, meetings of the Mid-Atlantic Council discuss policy for many fisheries, spread over several
states. In all, it seems unlikely that the Council meetings are moved for the convenience of the firms in
our sample, and hence unlikely that these meeting sites are endogenous. The meetings of the Surf-Clam
and Ocean Quahog Committee and Science and Statistical Committee meetings discuss only issues that
are relevant to the firms in our sample, and so their locations may depend upon firm characteristics. Our
data indicate that an average advisor is located 156.31 miles from meetings where advisors are invited to
participate and 156.97 miles frommeetings where advisors are not invited to participate. This suggests that,
firm locations do not have an important impact on meeting locations, even for subcommittee meetings.
In sum, the council meeting locations almost certainly do not depend upon firm characteristics, while the
subcommittee meeting locations do not appear to depend upon firms characteristics in any important way.
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 1 2 3 4 5 
Position 0.423** 
(0.214) 
0.408 
(0.291) 
0.252 
(0.362) 
0.211 
(0.355) 
 
Position2 0.615** 
(0.275) 
0.473 
(0.314) 
1.193*** 
(0.438) 
1.096*** 
(0.435) 
 
Position  
(non-binding years) 
  0.092 
(0.386) 
0.122 
(0.387) 
 
Position2  
(non-binding years) 
  -1.390*** 
(0.560) 
-1.401*** 
(0.558) 
 
S. C. Position  
(binding years) 
    -0.419 
(0.462) 
S. C. Position2 
(binding years) 
    1.598*** 
(0.593) 
O.Q. Position 
(binding years) 
    0.701 
(0.463) 
O. Q. Position2 
(binding years) 
    1.258** 
(0.644) 
Pure quota firm -2.387*** 
(0.734) 
-2.150*** 
(0.800) 
-2.573*** 
(0.884) 
-2.348*** 
(0.892) 
-3.518*** 
(0.971) 
Vessels  0.417*** 
(0.116) 
0.452*** 
(0.117) 
0.440*** 
(0.116) 
0.450*** 
(0.117) 
Plants  0.722*** 
(0.280) 
0.743*** 
(0.284) 
0.660** 
(0.267) 
0.828*** 
(0.269) 
Quota  -0.049 
(0.064) 
-0.070 
(0.066) 
-0.074 
(0.066) 
-0.098 
(0.062) 
Distance  -0.729*** 
(0.238) 
-0.726*** 
(0.234) 
-0.628*** 
(0.229) 
-0.699*** 
(0.226) 
Advisor Meeting   
 
 
 
1.546*** 
(0.411) 
 
 
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sigma 2.337*** 
(0.377) 
2.173*** 
(0.377) 
2.155*** 
(0.366) 
1.954*** 
(0.396) 
2.179*** 
(0.340) 
Log Likelihood -290.431 -245.213 -241.874 -234.559 -240.800 
Table 6: Random effects regressions. Models 1-3 and 5 present the results of
random effects Logit regressions explaining attendance. Model 4 presents a
similar regression but incorporates a two-stage correction for the probable
endogeneity of advisor status. Standard errors in this model are biased
downward. Asterisks denote parameter is statistically different from zero:
∗∗∗ indicates 1%, ∗∗ indicates 5%, and ∗ indicates 10% level of significance.
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 1 2 3 4 5 
Position 0.387 
(0.249) 
0.475 
(0.367) 
0.436 
(0.456) 
0.474 
(0.461) 
 
Position2 0.737*** 
(0.288) 
0.548 
(0.340) 
1.308*** 
(0.490) 
1.324*** 
(0.494) 
 
Position  
(non-binding years) 
  0.003 
(0.421) 
-0.052 
(0.423) 
 
Position2  
(non-binding years) 
  -1.401** 
(0.608) 
-1.388** 
(0.609) 
 
S. C. Position  
(binding years) 
    -0.520 
(0.646) 
S. C. Position2 
(binding years) 
    1.720** 
(0.751) 
O.Q. Position 
(binding years) 
    0.758 
(0.510) 
O. Q. Position2 
(binding years) 
    1.305* 
(0.688) 
Pure quota firm -1.344*** 
(0.843) 
-2.872*** 
(1.067) 
-3.471*** 
(1.230) 
-3.446*** 
(1.227) 
-4.034*** 
(1.402) 
Vessels  0.412*** 
(0.125) 
0.458*** 
(0.129) 
0.434*** 
(0.131) 
0.433*** 
(0.126) 
Plants  0.803** 
(0.359) 
0.815** 
(0.361) 
0.768** 
(0.374) 
0.931*** 
(0.353) 
Quota  -0.091 
(0.072) 
-0.110 
(0.073) 
-0.136* 
(0.077) 
-0.142** 
(0.068) 
Distance  -0.613** 
(0.278) 
-0.605** 
(0.274) 
-0.589** 
(0.287) 
-0.611** 
(0.273) 
Advisor Meeting   
 
 
 
1.817*** 
(0.689) 
 
 
Year Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cond. Log Likelihood -181.137 -147.179 -144.340 -140.447 -143.455 
Table 7: Fixed effects regressions. Models 1-3 and 5 present the results of
random effects Logit regressions explaining attendance. Model 4 presents a
similar regression but incorporates a two-stage correction for the probable
endogeneity of advisor status. Asterisks denote parameter is statistically
different from zero: ∗∗∗ indicates 1%, ∗∗ indicates 5%, and ∗ indicates 10%
level of significance.
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quadratic lies in a neighborhood of zero.
We now examine the possibility that the effect of position on attendance differs as the
total allowable catch is, or is not binding. Model 3 of Table 6 duplicates Model 2, but in-
cludes the variables ’Position (not binding)’ and ’Position2 (not binding)’. To calculate the
variable ’Position (not binding)’, for each species wemultiply a firm’s position index by an
indicator that is onewhen the species total allowable catch is not binding. We then sum the
two resulting species-specific position indices. The corresponding calculation generates
’Position2 (not binding)’. The results of these estimations are striking. We see that the
quadratic position term is positive and significant at the 1% level, while the quadratic
non-binding position term is also highly significant, and is of nearly equal magnitude,
but opposite sign. Indeed, a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the
sum of the two coefficients is zero (the Chi-square statistic is 0.632 with 90% critical value
2.70). Therefore, consistent with the intuition derived from Figure 1, the data suggest that
extremism only influences participation in years when the total allowable catch is binding.
Model 4 of Table 6 duplicates Model 3, but also includes a variable to indicate whether
a firm is able to exercise industry advisor status at the meeting in question. Since advisor
status is endogenously determined, we obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of the
advisor effects by using a two-stage estimation procedure (Greene 2000; Murphy and
Topel, 1985).19 Model 4 confirms the results of Model 3, and gives the expected result
that advisor status, all else equal, increases the likelihood of meeting attendance. Firms
are more likely to participate when they are provided an opportunity to speak during the
debate over the total allowable catch.
Model 5 includes all control variables used inModel 3, but uses species-specific position
variables for total allowable catch-binding years. That is, for each species, the position
variable is interacted with an indicator variable that is one if the total allowable catch
for the relevant species is binding in the year the meeting occurred. These results are
broadly consistent with results of other models. Moreover, we see that the magnitude of
coefficients on the linear position variables are statistically indistinguishable, similarly for
the coefficients on the second order term. A likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis
that the parameters on the linear and quadratic position terms are the same across clam
19The first stage estimation models the decision to become an advisor. The dependent variable (1 if a firm
is an industry advisor and 0 otherwise) is estimated with standard Logit regression. ’Advisor Meeting’ is
equal to the fitted probability of being an advisor if the meeting in question is one where advisors are asked
to participate, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables for the first stage model are the firm average of
vessels, plants, and individual tradable quotas, and distance to meetings. Alternative first stage explanatory
variables, including pre-1990 firm characteristics, had little effect on the second-stage results. It is not clear
how to implement the Murphy and Topel (1985) error correction for the random effects model. Thus we
present uncorrected, downward biased, standard errors for the two stage random effects models in columns
4 of Table 6. The fixed effect results report corrected standard errors. Since the standard error correction for
the fixed effects model was slight, we expect that the bias in Table 6 is slight. Additional details for the
two-stage estimation procedure are presented in an appendix.
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species could not be rejected at conventional levels. Thus aggregating the position indices
across species is reasonable.
We also estimate each of the models in Table 6 under the fixed effects specification and
report results in Table 7. Note that parameters and standard errors in model 4 of Table 7
are corrected for the probable endogeneity of advisor status (see Appendix). In all, fixed
effects results are difficult to distinguish from the random effects results. Thus, the effects
of extremism are present in both cross-sectional and time series variation in our data.
In summary, the regression results confirm and refine the patterns observed in the
raw data. We see that larger, nearer, and more extreme firms are more likely to attend.
However, the regression results also indicate that the effects of extremism operate only
when the total allowable catch is binding, a finding that was less clear in Figure 2.
Economic importance
The regression analysis finds that firm size, attendance costs, advisor status and firm
position all have statistically significant effects on the likelihood of participation in the
regulatory process. To get a sense for the magnitude of these effects, we calculate the
impact of a one standard deviation increase in explanatory variables on attendance prob-
ability, all else equal. The fitted parameters from Model 4 of Table 6 are used for this
purpose.20 A one standard deviation increase in vessels and plants causes a 0.011 and
0.008 increase, respectively in the probability of attending a meeting. Granting advisor
status increases the probability of attending an advisor meeting by 0.021. An increase
in travel distance to meeting sites reduces attendance probability by 0.012. Lastly, a one
standard deviation increase (decrease) in position increases the probability of attendance
by 0.011 (0.005). Since the average attendance probability at the mean of the data is 0.012,
these calculations suggest that relatively small changes in physical capital, distance, and
position have quite important impacts on attendance rates.
9. Competing models
We have treated meetings as if their sole purpose is to aggregate preferences. However,
it may also be that an important function of meetings is to aggregate private information
about clam stock abundance and demand conditions. In this case, we expect that firms
with better information are more likely to attend (Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)). At
first glance, this explanation appears consistent with our findings. A firm which owns
20Except for the effect of position, economic effects are calculated as the change in attendance probability
for a one standard deviation change in the variable of interest around its sample mean value, holding other
variables constant at their respective mean values. The 1994 value for λ is used. Because position enters
quadratically, we report a one standard deviation increase above and below the sample mean.
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more fishing vessels is likely to have better information about the state of the clam stock,
while a firm that sells more clams is likely to have better information about demand
conditions. Thus, our finding that larger firms are more likely to participate is consistent
with better informed firms participating.
Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to disentangle the effects of size from the
effects of information quality. Having said this, the theoretical literature on meetings
as a device for the aggregation of information, as opposed to preferences, suggests that
information aggregation is unlikely to be an important function of meetings.
The ability of meetings to aggregate information will be hampered by two problems.
First, information about the state of the world is a public good. In an environment where
it is costly to report one’s signal to the regulator we expect agents to free ride on the
reports of others.21 Second, if agents have different preferences over outcomes and they
have private information, then they will have an incentive to not reveal their private
information in order to skew the decision toward their preferred outcome. Analysis of
this problem suggests that in equilibrium, agents ’garble’ their signals by reporting the
intervals in which their signals lie (Li et al. (2001)), or that uniformed agents will submit
signals which favor their own preferred position (Banerjee and Somanathan (2001)). This
too works against the use of meetings to aggregate information.
It may also be the case that firms attend public meetings to trade quota rather than
to participate in the meeting. Under this hypothesis, we expect that larger nearer firms
attend more often since they will, on average, have more need to trade and will face lower
transactions costs. By definition, more extreme firms will have a greater need to trade
quota, and hence will also attend more often. While the predictions of this model match
nicely with our findings, industry representatives report that quota trading is not organ-
ized around meetings. Buyers outnumber sellers, and arranging a transaction involves
courting a seller and organizing the details of a highly regulated transaction denominated
in the millions of dollars.
Finally, it may be that meetings function as a way for firms to become informed about
regulators’ plans. Under this model, larger and more nearby firms should attend more
often, since, on average information will be more valuable to them and their transactions
costs are lower. We might also expect to see more extreme firms attend as these firms may
value information about future total allowable catches more highly. The predictions of
this model, too, match nicely with our findings. However, while it is surely true that firms
sometimes go to meetings solely to find out what regulators are doing, this is at best a
partial explanation. First of all, this model cannot explain the fact that attendees do, in fact,
make partisan statements: This is not an action which serves to elicit information, but one
21The importance of this public goods problem is illustrated by the ’Kitty Genovese’ game.
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that serves to change regulation. Second, the council maintains an extensive mailing list
of firms to whom it mails out information about the total allowable catch setting process,
so that the information advantage obtained by going to a meeting is marginal. Third, it is
contrary to what meeting participants report. Meeting participants do not say that they
go to meetings to learn what regulators are doing. They say they are going to change the
outcome of the regulatory process.
10. Conclusion
Meetings with costly participation are a very common regulatory institution, not least
because they play an important part in the formulation of US regulation. Using data from
the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, we analyze participation in public
meetings which determine regulation for this fishery.
The details of how meetings are conducted in the Mid-Atlantic Clam fishery and the
space from which a regulatory policy is selected both conform closely to recently ana-
lyzed models of participation in meetings and elections. Data on firm assets allows us to
construct position indices which measure a firms’ most preferred total allowable catches.
A simple and unrestrictive model of rent division in a quota-managed industry, comments
by firms, and a comparison of the position indices with stated policy preferences made at
meetings, all validate the indices.
Our analysis shows that attendance responds in the expected ways to firm character-
istics and proximity to meeting locations. Larger, closer, and more influential firms are
more likely to attend. These findings are observed in the raw data and in fixed and
random effects regression results. Most importantly, the analysis finds that firms with
more extreme tastes are more likely to attend. High attendance by extremists is suggested
by anecdotal reports of fishing firms’ behavior, is observed in our non-parametric analysis
(Figure 2), and is strongly evident in fixed and random effects regression results. Overall,
the analysis supports the conclusion that extremists are more likely to attend meetings
with costly participation than their more moderate counterparts.
These findings confirm the predictions of polarization and bipartisanship that arise
in a recent theoretical literature analyzing participation in meetings and elections. Our
findings also suggest a refinement to the well established idea that regulators will be
captured by the industry they regulate. At least when regulation is formed at meetings
with costly attendance, regulators will come under disproportionate pressure from firms
whose preferred policies are extreme relative to the population.
We note that, unless we regard ’representativeness’ as intrinsically good, the welfare
implications of these findings for the design of meeting protocols are at present ambigu-
ous. On the basis of the theory developed in Osborne et al. (2000) we would conclude
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that meetings which are more representative are probably desirable since such meetings
are less likely to exhibit the randomness of outcome that may occur at highly polarized
meetings. The anecdotes described earlier suggest that such vacillation by regulators is a
real phenomena, and it is difficult to imagine that these policy swings do not impose large
costs on the regulated population. On the basis of the analysis in Campbell (1999) we
would also conclude that the extent to which voluntary participation allows extremists to
dominate elections is undesirable. On the other hand, Borgers (2001) argues that meetings
with purely voluntary participation welfare dominate a variety of other meeting formats,
in particular those where attendance is compulsory and the meetings are perfectly repres-
entative. Since Borgers’ analysis does not allow for the sort of randomness that is possible
in Osborne et al. (2000), and since Osborne et al. (2000) do not attempt welfare analysis, it
remains unclear whether compulsory or voluntary attendance should be preferred.
A tentative conclusion is that voluntary attendance ought to be preferred for decisions
which are not expected to be contentious, but at least for decisions where the regulated
population is highly polarized, some modification of the meeting protocol should be
made to encourage participation by moderates. One such protocol would require a small
subset of randomly selected firms to attend meetings in order to increase the likelihood of
moderate voices in the debate. This conclusion is of immediate relevance to the current
crisis in US fisheries management. Recent proposals to streamline the public comment
process in fisheries regulation appear to involve marginal changes in participation costs,
rather than qualitative changes in the attendance decision. Thus these reforms should not
be expected to reduce influence of extremists over fisheries management councils.
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Appendix: Logistic estimation with panel data
The estimate of β is obtained by maximizing the likelihood of observing the Mi vector of
attendance events is Ai1,Ai2,...,AiMi , for all firms i = 1,...,N, where Mi is the number of
meeting periods in which firm i was active in the clam fishery. From Chamberlain (1980),
the fixed effects conditional Logit log likelihood function is
ln L =∑i ln
[
exp(β′ ∑Mi zimAim)/∑d∈Bi exp(β
′ ∑Mi zimdm)
]
, (A1)
where,
Bi = {d = (d1,...,dMi)|dm = 0 or 1 and ∑Mi dm = ∑Mi Aim}, (A2)
(time effects parameters and year dummy variables have been subsumed into β and zim,
respectively). The random effects log likelihood function for the Logit probability F is
ln L =∑i ln(
∫
ΠMiF(β
′zim + λt + α)Aim
(
1− F(β′zim + λt + α)
)1−Aim dG(α|α,σ2)), (A3)
where G is the normal univariate distribution function with mean α and variance σ2.
Two-stage estimation procedure
A firm’s decision to become an advisor and attend meetings can be characterized by a
system of Mi + 1 discrete decisions. Let Vi take the value of one if firm i chooses to
become an advisor and zero otherwise. We wish to maximize the likelihood of observing
(Vi,Ai1,Ai2,...,AiMi) for all i.
In the first-stage, the probability that firm i chooses to become an advisor is Pr(Vi =
1) = F(γ′xi) where xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and γ is a parameter vector.
The first-stage log likelihood function is
ln L1 =∑i
[
Vi ln F(γ′xi) + (1−Vi) ln(1− F(γ′xi))
]
, (A4)
Let γ̂ denote the value of γ that maximizes ln L1. The fitted probability of becoming an
advisor, F(γ̂′xi), is used to construct the regressor, Advisor Meeting. This variable is in-
cluded in the set of regressors for the second stagemodel. If standard regularity conditions
are met for both log-likelihood functions, the two-stage procedure yields consistent and
asymptotically normally distributed estimates of β.
The second stage likelihood contains the predicted advisor meeting variable. We follow
Murphy and Topel (1985) to obtain asymptotically correct standard errors for β under
the fixed effects specification. Denote the second stage conditional log likelihood in
equation (A1) as ln L2. Let H1 and H2 denote the inverse information matrices for the
maximized likelihood functions ln L1 and ln L2 respectively. The asymptotically correct
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variance-covariance matrix for β is
H∗2 = H2 +H2
[
CH′1C
′ − RH′1C′ − CH′1R′
]
H2, (A5)
where
C = E(
∂ ln L2
∂β
∂ ln L2
∂γ
), (A6)
R = E(
∂ ln L2
∂β
∂ ln L1
∂γ
). (A7)
Estimates of C and R are obtained as
Ĉ =
1
N ∑i(
∂ ln Li,2
∂β̂
∂ ln Li,2
∂γ̂
), (A8)
R̂ =
1
N ∑i(
∂ ln Li,2
∂β̂
∂ ln Li,1
∂γ̂
). (A9)
The first stage regression yielded reasonable results. The simple correlation between
the fitted probability of becoming an advisor, F(γ̂xi), and the actual indicator for advisors
was 0.533. The reported standard errors in model 4 of Table 7 are derived following
equation (A5) with H1 and H2 replaced by their estimated counterparts.
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